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‘...soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil’.  
John Maynard Keynes, closing words of The General Theory (1936). 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the international financial crisis is just the last in a series of economic 
calamities produced by a type of theory that converted the economics profession from a study 
of real world phenomena into what in the end became mathematized ideology. While the crises 
themselves started by halving real wages in many countries in the economic periphery, in Latin 
America in the late 1970s, their origins are found in economic theory in the 1950s when 
empirical reality became academically unfashionable. About half way in the destructive path of 
this theoretical tsunami – from its origins in the world periphery in the 1970s until today’s 
financial meltdowns – we find the destruction of the productive capacity of the Second World, 
the former Soviet Union. Now the chickens are coming home to roost: wealth and welfare 
destruction is increasingly hitting the First World itself: Europe and the United States. This 
paper argues that it is necessary to see these developments as one continuous process over 
more than three decades of applying neoclassical economics and neo-liberal economic policies 
that destroyed, rather than created, real wages and wealth. A reconstruction of widespread 
welfare will need to be based on the understanding that what unleashed the juggernaut of 
welfare destruction was not ‘market failure’; it was ‘theory failure’.  Being a résumé of a larger 
research project, the paper includes references to more detailed studies of these processes of 
‘destructive destruction’.  
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Introduction 
 
Two institutions established soon after WW II provided the conditions for a thirty year period 
of unprecedented increase in human welfare: The 1947 Marshall Plan, in the end re-
industrializing not only Europe but creating a cordon sanitaire of wealthy nations around the 
communist block from Norway via Southern Europe to Japan, and the 1948 Havana Charter 
which established the rules of international trade that made this industrialization plan possible.   
 
Both institutions were based on a key insight from Secretary of State George Marshall’s 1947 
Harvard Speech announcing his plan: that civilization had always been built on a particular 
type of economic structure. ‘The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with 
the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern 
civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown.’1  
                                                 
1 http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html (italics added). 
Marshall’s insight still holds. An important common element in the approximately 50 failed or failing 
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Industrialization became the marching order, and the Havana Charter organized world trade 
accordingly: as long as there was either an industrial plan or unemployment was present in a 
country it was possible to protect what the great liberal John Stuart Mill had promoted as 
‘infant industry protection’. Starting at the same time, this vision of industrialization formed the 
very core of classical development economics.2     
 
At the same time, wise legislation following the 1929 financial crash had harnessed finance as 
the servant of production, and already in 1945 Roosevelt’s advisor on science, Vannevar 
Bush, had given the West the task of pushing forward the ‘never ending frontier of scientific 
knowledge’ through continuous innovations.3 With a tripartite political setting – a balance of 
countervailing powers – between big business, big labor, and big government, all pieces were 
in place for the formidable increased welfare and economic growth that followed over the next 
decades.  
 
The vision that solidified in 1947 was not new, however, and not unique to the West. When 
Russian intellectuals some years after the 1917 revolution started analyzing communist 
economic policy, they found that it was essentially the same industrialization policy that had 
been followed under Sergei Witte, Minister of Finance under the last two tsars, but under a 
very different political regime. It is easily forgotten that during the 20th century this type of 
vision was shared along the whole political axis. Henry Ford’s United States, Hitler, Stalin, 
and Western European Welfare States all had a common understanding of wealth creation in 
industrialization and mass production and – parallel – an understanding of the necessarily 
subservient status of the financial sector to that of production.  
 
The 1947 vision was implicitly based on German economist Werner Sombart’s definition of 
capitalism as a system of production containing three main elements: a) the entrepreneur, b) 
the modern state, and c) the technological system, i.e. Vannevar Bush’ never ending frontier 
of scientific knowledge. These three main elements of successful capitalism were, however, 
extremely difficult to formalize, and gradually they all disappeared from economic theory. The 
new typical definition of capitalism became that of a system of private ownership where all 
coordination outside the firm is determined by the market. As Sombart’s three elements 
disappeared from neoclassical economics, so did the qualitative understanding of economic 
growth and development. Economics came to be based on what Schumpeter called ‘the 
pedestrian view that it is the accumulation of capital per se that propels the capitalist engine’. 
This, and the disappearance of Schumpeter’s distinction between the monetary sphere (‘the 
accounting units’) and the real economy, opened the way for the present dominance of the 
financial sector over the productive sector.      
 
The 1947 type of understanding had a very long history in Europe. American economic 
historian Richard Goldthwaite shows the historical importance of the dichotomy between raw 
materials and manufacturing in a recent book: what is generally seen as Europe’s 
‘commercial revolution’, Goldthwaite argues, was in fact a process of emulating other 
countries, one of import substitution: manufactured goods, that had previously been imported 
                                                                                                                                            
states today is that the manufacturing industry contributes less than six per cent of GDP (see Reinert, 
Kattel & Amaïzo quoted below.  
  
2 For a discussion, see Kattel, Rainer, Jan Kregel and Erik S. Reinert. Ragnar Nurkse (1907-2007): 
Classical Development Economics and its Relevance for Today. London: Anthem Other Canon Series, 2009. 
 
3 http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm#transmittal 
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from the Levant started to be produced in Europe from the 12th century onwards. 4 A recent 
book documents that this process of emulation – rather than of comparative advantage – was 
the main strategy also of Enlightenment Europe.5     
 
 
Figure 1: Comparing economic development in Somalia and Korea 
 
Source: Reinert, Amaïzo and Kattel, 2009.6  
 
The wealth and poverty of nations are still determined by the dichotomy between raw 
materials on the one hand and manufacturing and advanced services on the other. Figure 1 
illustrates the explosive growth of South Korea, starting only in the very late 1960s, as that 
nation diversified its economy away from agriculture and raw materials and into 
manufacturing industry. Through very heavy-handed industrial policy, Korea broke away from 
its ‘comparative advantage’ in agriculture. By comparison, Somalia – being richer that Korea 
until the mid-1960s – did not, and instead continued to specialize according to its comparative 
advantage in being poor.       
 
Understanding this extremely important distinction – between raw materials subject to 
diminishing returns, monoculture, and perfect competition on the one hand, and manufactured 
goods and advanced services subject to increasing returns, dynamic imperfect competition, 
and a large division of labor on the other – was the economic basis for Stalinism, for the 
Marshall Plan and Keynesian social democracy in Western Europe following World War II, 
and for US capitalism. The trail of economic destruction that has sequentially hit the world 
                                                 
4 Goldthwaite, Richard (2009). The Economy of Renaissance Florence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, pp. 6-8. 
 
5 Reinert, Sophus, Translating Empire, Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
6 Reinert, Erik S., Yves Ekoué Amaïzo and Rainer Kattel ‘The Economics of Failed, Failing and Fragile 
States: Productive Structure as the Missing Link’, in Kahn, Shahrukh Rafi & Jens Christiansen Towards 
New Developmentalism: Market as Means Rather Than Master, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 59-86. 
WP version http://tg.deca.ee/eng/working_papers/   
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since the mid-1970s is largely the result of neo-classical economic theory (‘mainstream 
economics, ‘standard textbook economics’) which – by destroying economics as an empirical 
science – unlearned the wisdom of close to 800 years of economic policy and also the former 
common understanding of wealth creation from the United States on the right to the USSR on 
the left.   
 
 
The problem: unlearning the activity-specific element of economic growth and welfare   
 
Economic growth for most of the 20th century was based on standardized mass production, 
what is also called Fordism. Henry Ford used to say that ‘you can have the car in any colour 
you like as long as it is black’. Also the Soviet Union depended on mass production, and in 
communist China everyone even dressed alike. As indicated there was an important 
isomorphism – an element of strong structural similarity – along the political right-left axis: all 
successful 20th century societies were based on the same standardized industrial mass 
production. As Goldthwaite points out, industrialization, albeit on a much smaller scale, has 
been the one factor of success that built Europe. This had been recognized very early in 
practical policy, during the late 1400s, in England. The theoretical explanation came in 1613 
with Italian economist Antonio Serra7, whose theory of economic development based on 
increasing returns and a large division of labor was quoted by the main industrial theorist of 
the 19th century, German economist Friedrich List, and also by Marx. List not only inspired US 
and continental European economic policy, he also inspired Russian Finance Minister Sergei 
Witte – already mentioned – who translated List’s work from German into Russian. For an 
important early link between Friedrich List and Marxist understanding of the importance of 
industry, see Szporluk (1991)8. 
 
For most of the 20th century, then, advanced nations left and right all followed the same 
industrialization strategy. David Ricardo’s free trade theories based on comparative 
advantage were in practice only used towards the colonies. While the United States insisted 
on Ricardian trade theory and standard textbook economics as the foundation for the world 
economic order, Paul Krugman complained as late as the 1990s that US own trade policy 
failed to follow the principles of Ricardian trade theory:  
 
‘the view of trade as a quasi-military competition is the conventional wisdom among policy-
makers, business leaders, and influential intellectuals…It is not just that economics has lost 
control of the discourse; the kind of ideas that are offered in a standard economics textbook 
do not enter into that discourse at all…’9   
 
Just like with David Ricardo’s theories in 19th century England, the US Washington 
Consensus free trade theories were for a long time mainly intended for export, not for use at 
home. Unfortunately, in the end the West also started believing in the propaganda version of 
its own economic theory.      
 
                                                 
7 Serra, Antonio, A ‘Short Treatise’ on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1613), ed. Sophus A. Reinert, 
London: Anthem Other Canon Series, 2011.  
 
8 Szporluk, Roman, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
 
9 Quoted in Reder, Melvin, Economics. The Culture of a Controversial science, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999, p. 6 
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A creeping mathematization and formalization of economics took place after World War II. 
Economics became ‘social physics’ based on late 19th century physics. With this development 
the distinction between industry and the production of raw materials – between increasing 
returns and large synergies on the one hand and diminishing returns and monoculture on the 
other hand – became blurred and disappeared. Increasing returns was thrown out of 
economic theory because it was not compatible with equilibrium; instead equilibrium should 
have been thrown out as the centrepiece of economics because it is not compatible with 
reality. Traditional development economics disappeared and The Washington Consensus 
slowly took over. Technological change, increasing and diminishing returns, and 
entrepreneurship disappeared from economic theory, obliterating any signals of dangers of a 
de-industrialization. In short: with the coming of neo-classical economics and neoliberalism all 
economic activities came to be seen as being qualitatively alike, in sharp contrast to the 
immediate post-WW II axis between the US and the USSR referred to above.   
 
Economics de facto returned to the ‘colonial’ postulates of David Ricardo: that the 
international economy could and ought to be based on nations bartering labour hours: What a 
nation produced – industrial high-technology or subsistence agriculture – did not matter. On 
top of this, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund started assuming full 
employment in all their models. Even if only 10 or 20 per cent of the potentially economically 
active population in a country actually had a job, full employment was assumed. This cruel 
Washington Consensus postulate made it possible to launch and continue the devastating 
shock therapies that hit The Third World and then The Second World. Only now ‘the chickens 
are coming home to roost’ as the American saying goes: only now, as the wave of destruction 
of neo-classical economics hits the United States and Europe through de-industrialization and 
financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2: Development economics lost:  
Growth rate of GDP per capita of selected world regions; regional average in selected periods 
between 1820 and 2001; annual average compound growth rate 
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Source: Kattel, Kregel and Reinert (2009). Original data from Maddison 2003. 
 
real-world economics review, issue no. 60 
7 
 
Figure 2 shows the excellent world development record from 1950 until 1973, compared to 
the dismal performance following from 1973 to 2001. During this period Latin America 
experienced a string of ‘lost decades’, Africa’s beginning industrialization was reversed, and 
The Second World – the communist planned economies – experienced a free trade shock 
that made them poorer than they had been under a notoriously inefficient planned economy. 
The old truth was once again revealed: a nation with an inefficient manufacturing sector is 
much better off than a nation without any manufacturing sector at all.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, only Asian nations continued to be successful. Asia was 
largely unaffected by the free trade shock and continued their industrialization strategies, that 
in India and China had started already in the late 1940s. In fact, if India and China with their 
huge populations are removed from the data sets, globalization has been more a failure than 
a success. As we shall see later, this is even more so if we look at this development in terms 
of real wages rather than in terms of GDP per capita (because wages as a percentage of 
GDP have been reduced across the board).  
 
 
From the mid-1970s: The Washington institutions chasing and destroying ‘rents’ in the 
productive sector only to re-create them in the financial sector 
 
Since its very inception in the late Middle Ages, capitalism has been a process of what 
economists call ‘rent seeking’: through incessant invention and innovation capitalists have 
sought above average profits, also called rents. The early successful capitalist societies – 
Venice, the Dutch Republic, and England – all built their wealth on three types of rent. 1. They 
dominated the manufacturing sector in Europe, achieving the rents from increasing returns 
that are absent in agriculture. 2. They collected rents from dominating long-distance colonial 
trade, and 3. They all collected rent from dominating the market for a natural resource: salt in 
Venice, pickled – or salted – herring in the Dutch Republic, and wool in England. In all cases 
the raw materials went into manufacturing.    
 
In a modern economy rents from oligopolies and innovations spread first as increased profits 
to the entrepreneur, then as higher wages to an increasingly skilled labor force, and then as 
higher taxable income to the state. In effect the system becomes one of triple rent-seeking: 
capital, labor, and government collude to share the oligopolistic rents. Minimum wages are an 
important tool for insuring such a ‘collusive’ distribution of the rents from innovations. In other 
words, rent-seeking in a sea of oligopolistic competition is what capitalism is all about. As 
labor also became oligopolistic through unionization, John Kenneth Galbraith described 
capitalism at its best – as in the US in the decades following World War II – as a system of 
countervailing powers of big business, big labor, and big government. Emulating the West, 
the Soviet Union attempted to create the same type of rents from the very same industries 
and economic activities – from steel and car production to space travel – that dominated in 
the United States. The best years of capitalist growth and the best years of growth of planned 
economy were based on the old idea – dating from Antonio Serra in 1613 – that economic 
growth and welfare were activity-specific, at any point in time they were produced by certain 
economic activities. Appendix 1 shows the qualitative differences between economic activities 
that are good for economic development (Schumpeterian activities) and those that are bad for 
economic development (Malthusian activities).   
 
The same best years of growth were found in the Nordic countries, which were long seen as a 
very successful Third Way between capitalism and communism. The Swedish case is 
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interesting because the formula for industrial success after WW II can be personified in three 
individuals, Schumpeterian economist Erik Dahmén (1916-2005), who for decades worked for 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the bank’s owner Marcus Wallenberg (1899-1982), and social 
democratic politician Gunnar Sträng (1906-1992). Sträng held ministerial posts in the Swedish 
government from 1947 until 1976, the last 21 years as Minister of Finance. Industrialist 
Wallenberg and his advisor Dahmén had lunch every Wednesday, and capitalist Wallenberg 
and social democrat Sträng met, often in secrecy, to solve the big issues. This type of 
arrangement developed the Fordist wage regime – that the fruits of industrial productivity 
were shared between capital and labor – and the accompanying ratchet wheel effect of 
welfare capitalism: wages could only go up, not down. Steadily increasing wages – the fact 
that capital steadily became cheaper compared to labor – provided a key engine of growth in 
the golden decades of economic growth.    
 
That wages were irreversible in monetary terms – the ratchet wheel effect – also had an 
important positive effect during what Hyman Minsky correctly called a financial crisis: the so-
called ‘oil crisis’ of the 1970s. During this crisis the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve 
under the leadership of Arthur F. Burns – from 1970 to 1978 – was expansive, and the end 
result was that the purchasing power of wages and salaries was maintained during the crisis 
while negative real interest rates forced money out of banks and into productive investments 
in the real economy. Neo-classical economists, with their excessive emphasis on monetary 
stability rather than the stability of the real economy (Keynes’ ‘tyranny of the general price 
level’), tend to look on Burns as a failure. Compared to what we are seeing during this 
financial crisis – demand collapsing from austerity and the financial sector benefitting from 
debt deflation – Arthur F. Burns’ solution is vastly to be preferred. Burns was a student of 
Wesley Clair Mitchell, the business cycle theorist, who again was a student of Thorstein 
Veblen, who rightly can be characterized as a precursor of Keynes.10 
 
As an economist of the old institutional school, Arthur Burns was aware of the risk of using 
equilibrium economics when what was really happening was something entirely different, 
namely cumulative causations. Burns’ words from 1954 apply extremely well to the Western 
world today:   
   
‘The warnings of a Marx, a Veblen, or a Mitchell that economists were neglecting changes in 
the world gathering around them, that preoccupations with states of equilibrium led to tragic 
neglect of principles of cumulative change, went unheeded.’11 
    
Everywhere economic theory came to follow the same path of least mathematical resistance 
towards equilibrium as being the only dominating metaphor: the key factors that could not be 
formalized and mathematized – factors that determine the qualitative differences between 
economic activities in Appendix 1 and factors that create financial crises – were just left out of 
the theoretical edifice of economics. At present Western democracies have largely unlearned 
how their own countries got rich, and this lack of knowledge jeopardizes recovery.     
 
During the years of Western triumphalism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall all vestiges 
of capitalist moderation, e.g. those contained in the teachings of Thorstein Veblen, John 
                                                 
10 See L. Randall Wray, “Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise and Keynes’ Monetary Theory of 
Production”, in Reinert, Erik S. and Francesca Viano (eds.), Thorstein Veblen: Economics for an Age of 
Crises, London: Anthem Other Canon Series, forthcoming 2012.    
 
11 Arthur F. Burns, The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 
p. 46.  
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Maynard Keynes, and Karl Polanyi, were gradually abolished. The present financial crisis is a 
direct result of an intellectual arrogance where things that could not be modeled by the tools 
chosen by the mainstream gradually came to be seen as irrelevant. The huge rents collected 
today by the financial sector are made possible by the assumptions on which neo-classical 
economics is built and which produce the ‘flaws’ of the model: the rents presently collected by 
the financial sector are in effect assumption-based rents.     
 
It is now generally recognized that Hyman Minsky provides the best modern understanding of 
financial crises. But when present chairman of The Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, wrote a 
book about the 1929 crisis and the Great Depression a few years back, he mentions Hyman 
Minsky only once, and that just to dismiss him. This because Minsky ‘had to depart from the 
theory of rational economic behavior’.12 During the last 30-40 years being a mainstream 
economist has meant not to accept mechanisms that doubtlessly are hugely important, on the 
grounds that these mechanisms were in conflict with the fundamental assumptions of 
standard economic theory. In this way even the people with the main responsibility for 
handling the crises were gradually isolating themselves from the most relevant theories 
explaining it.         
 
Neo-classical economics starts from assumptions of ‘perfect competition’, ‘perfect 
information’, and ‘perfect foresight’. This is a situation where it is difficult for a company to 
make money, a situation – including the assumption of diminishing returns – that reflects the 
reality of Third World countries rather than that of First World ones. Not understanding that 
capitalism is about collecting innovation-based rents, the World Bank and IMF spent almost 
40 years destroying production-based rent in the world periphery – from Peru via Russia to 
Mongolia and now the West itself – while tilting the playing field towards financial rents. 
Existing industrial rents were largely destroyed by premature shock liberalization, but – as we 
shall see in Figure 6 – this policy instead led to rapidly increasing rents in the financial sector.  
 
Figure 3 shows how real wages in Peru were more than halved when the free trade shock 
and subsequent de-industrialization hit the country starting in the mid-1970s. The vocabulary 
now pertaining to the policy of wage destruction was also invented here: in Peru the year 
1978 was officially named “The Year of Austerity” (Año de la Austeridad). Seen from the 
Washington Institutions the story could be presented as one of success because exports 
were skyrocketing. In reality the income of the average person was more than halved. I have 
also, in detail, documented a very similar process of de-industrialization and halving of real 
wages in Mongolia starting in the early 1990s.13   
 
Presently financial markets have collapsed also in the West, and even the United States finds 
that too much free trade has undermined its manufacturing base, and that the lack of 
purchasing power of the common man is a main obstacle to recovery and increased 
employment. In an attempt to recover – having unlearned the essential Keynesian paradox of 
thrift – the West embarked on the same austerity-based attack on purchasing power and 
wage levels that had previously been employed in Peru and other Latin American countries 
                                                 
12 Bernanke, Ben S. (ed.), Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000, p. 43. 
 
13 Reinert, Erik S., ‘Globalisation in the Periphery as a Morgenthau Plan: The Underdevelopment of 
Mongolia in the 1990’s’, in Reinert, Erik (ed.), Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An 
Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004, pp. 157-214.  
 http://www.othercanon.org/papers/ 
real-world economics review, issue no. 60 
10 
 
and later in the Second World. The results promise to be just as devastating to real wages 
and purchasing power in the West as it has been elsewhere.   
 
 
Figure 3: Industrialization, de-industrialization and falling real wages in Peru 
 
Source: Reinert 2007.14 
 
The de-industrialization of large parts of Latin America and of the little industry that had been 
created in Africa started during the mid-1970s. The de-industrialization of the Second World 
started more than 20 years later, after the fall of the Berlin wall. A third wave of destruction 
was represented by the financial crises starting in Asia in the summer of 1997 and in Russia 
in the summer of 1998. These crises provided a dress rehearsal for the crises that would hit 
the capitalist core, the United States and Western Europe, 10 years later. An important 
element in Figure 3 is the apparent success of exports accompanied by collapsing wages. A 
similar pattern of increased exports accompanied by falling wages can now be observed in 
the EU periphery, normally reflecting a deterioration of the Terms of Trade.   
 
Part of the same problem as the Asian Crisis was the 1998 collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in the United Sates, losing 4.6 billion dollars in less than 4 months. 
However, these two warnings showing the mechanisms of economic collapse were never 
seen as signs that something could be wrong with the economic system and economic 
theory. The Asian crisis was seen as a result of ‘Asian values’ and ‘crony capitalism’, not of 
any weakness in the structure of capitalism or in economic theory. LTCM Board of directors 
members included Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who – ironically enough – shared 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences a few months into the Asian crisis, in 1997. 
Instead of seeing the writing on the wall, the economics profession blindly gave its most 
prestigious reward to the creators of financial tools which investment Guru Warren Buffet later 
would call ‘time bombs’ and ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’.   
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Reinert, Erik S., How Rich Countries got Rich… and why Poor Countries stay Poor, London: 
Constable, 2007. 
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Figure 4: Exchange rates and falling real wages and production in Russia, 1992-2001. 
 
 
Source: Reinert & Kattel (2010).15 
 
Figure 4 shows the destruction of the productive structures and real wages in Russia, starting 
with the neoliberal shock therapy of 1992. Industrial production was reduced by more than 50 
per cent, and real wages by almost 50 per cent. Note that agricultural production took a 
similar destructive dip. It is also important to note the important role which must have been 
played by the huge overvaluation of the rouble. Only with the massive devaluation in the fall 
of 1998, production and wages started to recover.  
 
In the 1930s the crisis was solved through ‘trade wars’ which created employment. During the  
present crisis the equivalent is ‘currency wars’, which mainly cause financial gains from 
speculation. The damage created to national productive structures by artificially high 
exchange rates – as in Greece and other countries in the EU periphery – can be read off in 
the Russian graph in Figure 4. This further contributes to a phenomenon discussed in the 
next section: the growth of the financial sector as a percentage of GDP at the expense of the 
production sector.      
 
 
Resurrection as post-industrial feudalism? 
 
The first wave of neo-classical wealth destruction hit most of Latin America starting in the mid-
1970s. At the same time Africa started losing the little industry the continent had managed to 
build. The second big wave of destructive destruction hit the Second World after the 1989 fall 
of the Berlin Wall. The present economic crisis in the European Union started in the Baltic 
countries, and was fundamentally caused by the long-term effect of the severe de-
                                                 
15 Reinert, Erik S. & Rainer Kattel (2010), ‘Modernizing Russia: Round III. Russia and the other BRIC 
countries: forging ahead, catching up or falling behind?’ 
 http://tg.deca.ee/files/main/2010090707562222.pdf 
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industrialization of those countries that took place in the early 1990s, coupled with the refusal 
to adjust the exchange rate in order to save the productive structure rather than to save the 
banks.16  
 
Now seemingly country after country in Europe, starting with Greece, become victims of the 
same pattern of de-industrialization and overvalued currencies. It is surprising that Germany 
seems not to have learned the lessons regarding overvalued currencies that emerge so 
clearly from the 1990 unification of the two Germanies. While the market exchange rate 
between the Westmark and Ostmark – the currencies of West and East Germany respectively 
– at the time was one Westmark for three Ostmark, with the unification wages were converted 
at the rate of one to one. This made economic activity in the former East Germany 
uncompetitive, which in turn a) forced people to move from the East to the West, and b) made 
the unification process – raising the standards of living in the East – immensely expensive. 
The same mechanisms are presently at work in Greece.    
  
Only few nations outside the core of capitalism – Western Europe and North America – 
escaped the waves of destruction of the 1970s and 1990s. Only now, with the failure of 
mainstream economics to clearly distinguish between the financial sector and real wealth 
creation, are Western Europe and North America being hit by the destructive destruction of 
neo-classical economics. Figure 5 shows how the presently very successful BIC countries – 
Brazil, India, and China – escaped virtually unhurt from the free market fundamentalism and 
free trade shock that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall, what one author dubbed ‘the 
end of history’. The experience of the BRIC countries contrasts sharply with the massive 
welfare destruction that hit the USSR/Russia.     
 
 
Figure 5: Per capita GDP in selected countries: 1950-2008, in 1990 international dollars: 
USSR/Russia, Brazil, China, and India.  
 
 
Source: Angus Maddison (2003) and The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, Total Economy Database, June 2009, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/ 
 
                                                 
16 Reinert, Erik S & Rainer Kattel (2007). ’European Eastern Enlargement as Europe's Attempted 
Economic Suicide?  http://tg.deca.ee/files/main//2007070309122525.pdf 
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The main difference between the BIC countries (Brazil, India and China) on the one hand and 
the USSR/Russia on the other lies in the speed of trade liberalization. India and China only 
slowly opened up the system of industrial protection that had been in place since the late 
1940s. No doubt both China and India had protected their industries too long. The difference 
in the curves in Figure 5 shows, however, the extreme risk of opening up for free trade too 
early rather than too late. 
  
Brazil’s ‘economic miracle’ started only in the 1960s and early -70s, but since then both the 
Brazilian economy and Brazilian development ideology have been out of synch with the rest 
of the Western Hemisphere. While the smaller Latin American countries could not escape the 
clutches of a market fundamentalism that destroyed state capacities and economic 
institutions which are needed for economic development, Brazil escaped relatively unharmed. 
Like India and China, Brazil was protected by institutional inertia and a large diversity of 
economists. There neoliberalism met with a critical mass of resistance from economists of 
other persuasion than the neo-classical one. The huge Brazilian development bank, BNDS – 
which now has a larger capital base than the World Bank – continues to play a decisive role in 
Brazil’s growth.  
 
 
Figure 6: Peru: De-industrialization and wages falling as a share of GDP: 1950-1990. 
 
Legend, from top, profits, pre-dial (tax), income of the self-employed, wages.  
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. Breakdown of GDP by source has not been published after 
1990.  
 
Figure 5, which compared the BRIC countries, indicates that Russia may have recovered lost 
territory. However, the countries that had been through the shock therapy of de-
industrialization continued on a different growth path than before, regardless of being formerly 
capitalist or formerly planned economy. The mass destruction of industry destroyed the rents 
for a huge number of industrial workers and middle class office employees. The GDP of these 
de-industrialized countries went through a structural transformation in which wages and 
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income of the self-employed radically shrank as a percentage of GDP, while the FIRE sector 
(Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) grew rapidly. Figure 6 shows this national redistribution 
of income from labor to capital in the case of Peru. This is a pattern of income distribution that 
reminds one more of feudalism than of an industrial society, and which hides huge social 
problems.      
 
In many ways, the United States can be seen as the prototype successful developmental 
state. US economist Henry Carey (1793–1879) insisted that trading too much with Britain 
would preclude the United States from enjoying the bounties of future technological change. 
Carey also devised what he called a ‘commodity map’, which illustrates how the presence of a 
manufacturing sector changes the way income is distributed within a nation. Carey’s map, 
which could also have been called a ‘development synergy’ map, is an illustration of the 
centuries-old observation of the effects of a manufacturing sector. Today, the map can be 
used to explain the mechanisms that led to the structural changes in income distribution that 
we observe in Peru in Figure 6, the mechanisms by which Washington Consensus policies 
increased poverty in the world periphery. I suggest Figure 6 may also represent the structural 
change presently taking place in the West, and which occurred with the large dip in Russian 
GDP shown in figure 4. The Russian resurrection of growth was accompanied by a new 
income distribution where the FIRE sector had grown very much.  
 
 
Figure 7: Henry Carey’s ‘Commodity Map’ (1858)17 
 
 
Figure 7 represents the breakdown of a typical dollar’s worth of goods, i.e. a proxy for what 
we would call output or GDP. The height of the graph represents 100 per cent of GDP. Carey 
shows how different the composition of GDP was in the developed East compared to the 
undeveloped West of the United States at the time; the graph indicates how the composition 
of output changes as one moves gradually from Boston to St. Louis – from right to left in the 
figure – or vice versa. Economic development – increasing the division of labor and 
manufacturing – is represented by moving east from St. Louis, Missouri towards Boston. 
Poverty and backwardness grow as one moves west from Boston to St. Louis. St. Louis thus 
represents the situation in the undeveloped world or periphery today. Here, raw materials – 
e.g. cotton or cattle – are produced; land is abundant and cheap, labor is unskilled and cheap, 
                                                 
17 Source: Perelman, Michael (2002). ‘The Comparative Sociology of Environmental Economics in the 
Works of Henry Carey and Karl Marx’, History of Economics Review, 36, Summer: 85-110. 
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tasks are simple, and the division of labor is limited. Under such conditions, Carey says, 
profits take up a large share of the GDP.  
 
The East, Boston, represents today’s developed world with a large division of labor that adds 
a lot of value to a raw materials base. In the East, in contrast to the underdeveloped West, a 
multitude of workers combine their efforts within a complex social division of labor to work raw 
materials into ever more sophisticated products. More skills are required, increasing returns 
create higher profits and higher barriers to entry. Here, wages and rents form a much larger 
portion of the value of products, while profits shrink to a smaller percentage of GDP. The 
shock therapies from Latin America to Russia and Mongolia created a structural economic 
change that corresponds to travelling from Boston to St. Louis in Carey’s diagram. 
    
If a nation should move over time from Boston to St. Louis, that means undoing the synergies 
of development, reversing the critical mass that creates wealth, in a sense travelling from 
capitalism back in time towards something resembling feudalism in a post-industrial variety. 
This more than 150 year old graph shows how Washington Consensus policies that started in 
the late 1970s have produced the same regressive effect as Henry Carey claims moving from 
Boston to St. Louis would have done in 1858: wages as a percentage of GDP sank slowly, 
while rents and profits – the FIRE sector: finance, insurance and real estate – grew 
correspondingly. 
 
 
The solution: Back to basics, resurrecting the alternative canon of economics 
 
Perhaps the best metaphor for today’s economic situation in the West is that of Walt Disney’s 
Uncle Scrooge and his bin of unproductive money (what the Bible refers to as ‘mammon’) 
representing a growing part of the financial sector. Scrooge’s money is idle, and he only uses 
it for bathing purposes. Imagine Scrooge having lent money to Greece and other countries, 
and the debt payments – while causing the Greek economy to shrink – only accumulating as 
a bigger bin of ide money in which Scrooge swims. Presently our efforts to ‘save’ Greece and 
other countries only cause transfers of money from one bin of idle money to another: it does 
not reach Greece and its people whom we are pretending to save. As Francis Bacon said 
already 400 years ago: ‘Money is like muck, not good except it be spread’. 
 
Neo-classical economics – not distinguishing between the financial economy and the real 
economy – tends to see this destruction of real wealth and accumulation of idle capital merely 
as an innocuous market activity. Neoliberalism in practice meant financial capital hijacking the 
market rhetoric in order to re-enact what seems to be developing into a modern version of 
debt slavery. This is the same problem democracy was not able to handle in the 1930s. Karl 
Polanyi suggests that the systems that emerged during the crisis of the 1930s were similar 
only in disregarding laissez-faire principles. Indeed, we can observe that the most important 
thing communism, fascism, and Roosevelt’s New Deal had in common was that they all saw 
the need to reign in the financial sector to become the servant rather than the master of 
capitalist development.       
 
The situation facing the world in 2012 is in many ways also similar to that which faced the 
world in the revolutionary year 1848. Free trade economics had triumphed in 1846 with the 
Repeal of the Corn Laws, but victory was to be short-lived. Widespread social problems and a 
massive financial crisis in 1847 had prepared the ground for revolutions in all large European 
countries with the exception of England and Russia, in 1848. The enemy then was 
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Manchester-liberalism based on the free trade theories of David Ricardo, a very similar 
movement to today’s neoliberalism. Manchester-liberalism and neoliberalism both threat to 
undo the wealth-creating synergies of an industrialized economy.    
 
The revolutions of 1848 produced two politically extreme positions, two utopias: communism 
and Manchester-liberalism. But by the mid-1890s the economics profession in Europe had rid 
itself of both political extremes. The victory of the middle ground was well described by 
German economist Gustav Schmoller in his 1897 inaugural speech as Rector of the 
University of Berlin:   
                                                                                                               
‘The simplistic  optimism of ’laissez-faire’ and the childish and frivolous appeal to revolution, 
the naive hope that the tyranny of the proletariat would lead to world happiness, increasingly 
showed their real nature, they were twins of an ahistorical rationalism…. The old doctrines of 
individualistic natural law were transformed from the humanistic idealism of an Adam Smith to 
the hard mammonism of the Manchester School and (were useless for the present 
situation)…  The period 1870-1890 led to the theoretical and practical bankruptcy of both the 
old schools’. 
  
Again the task is to recuperate the middle ground. Of the three political systems which 
brought financial capital under control during the 1930s – communism, fascism and The New 
Deal – there is little doubt what most people today would choose. But is that an option as long 
as neo-classical economics – the useful fools of the financial sector – virtually monopolizes 
Western universities? Starting in the 1970s neoliberalism – the ‘Manchester School’ – once 
again showed its destructive powers. After waves of destructive destruction, first in the Third 
World, then in the Second – former communist world, the turn has come to the First World, to 
the West itself. We again ought to remember the lesson from Gustav Schmoller and the 
Historical School of Economics that he founded, the school that created the Western 
European welfare state. Several wheels do not have to be reinvented. The principles of the 
Havana Charter – unanimously approved by the members of the United Nations in 1948 – 
can also in today’s context serve as a blueprint for a world economic order that creates, rather 
than destroys, mass welfare. 
   
In the triumphalism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, both the political middle ground 
and its successful tools for welfare creation were lost to an economic theory largely based on 
what Schumpeter described as the Ricardian Vice: Applying severely simplified abstractions 
to the solution of practical problems. Or, as my colleague Wolfgang Drechsler calls it: 
‘irrelevance as methodology’.  
    
If the American Dream is to be recaptured, it cannot be done without resurrecting the kind of 
economic understanding which, from 1820 onwards, created American industrialization, but in 
a new and present context. One place to start understanding what went wrong in Europe is to 
contrast the gradual and successful integration of Spain into the EU during the 1980s – based 
on the principles of Friedrich List – with the failure of de-industrializing shock therapies 
applied to the Baltic countries first in the 1990s, and then with the 2004 EU integration.      
 
There is a political middle ground to be recaptured, and with it another canon of economics 
than the one represented by neo-classical economics and the Washington Consensus. This 
experience-based canon must also – as did Schumpeter and many others – distinguish the 
real economy from the financial sector, seeing that, if unregulated, the symbiosis that in good 
times exists between the financial sector and the real economy may develop into a situation 
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where the financial sector no longer adds value to the real economy, but parasitically destroys 
value, as countries from Greece to the United States are now experiencing.18 In this other 
canonical tradition economic activities are qualitatively different, and this understanding forms 
the necessary foundation for creating national wealth. A whole tradition – a qualitatively 
different way of thinking – needs to be rediscovered, resurrected, and applied to economic 
policy.    
 
 
Appendix 1: Schumpeterian and Malthusian Economic Activities 
 
Characteristics of     Characteristics of 
Schumpeterian activities    Malthusian activities 
(= ‘good’ export activities) (= ‘bad’ export activities if no 
Schumpeterian sector present) 
 
Increasing returns    Diminishing returns 
 
Dynamic imperfect    ‘Perfect competition’ 
competition (‘rent-seeking’)   (commodity competition) 
 
Stable prices     Extreme price fluctuations 
 
Generally skilled labor    Generally unskilled labor 
 
Creates a middle class    Creates a ‘feudalist’ class structure 
 
Irreversible wages    Reversible wages 
(‘stickiness’ of wages) 
 
Technical change    Technical change   
leads to higher wages for the   tends to lower price for the consumer 
producer 
(‘Fordist wage regime’) 
 
Creates large synergies    Creates few synergies 
(linkages, clusters) 
 
Source: Reinert (2007)  
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